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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
E. L. MURPHY TRUCKING COM-
PANY. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CLIMATE CONTROL, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent, 
vs. 
AMERICAN STANDARD, INC., 
Co-Defendant - Co-Respondent 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by an interstate motor carrier to 
recover freight charges from the manufacturer and from 
the recipient of certain goods transported by the carrier. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court for the Third Judicial District, Stewart M. Hanson, 
granted the motions for summary judgment of respondent 
Case No. 
13555 
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Climate Control, Inc., and of co-respondent American 
Standard, Inc., and denied appellant's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents ask this Court to affirm the order and 
judgment of the court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
.. Respondent Climate Control, Inc. and co-respondent 
American Standard, Inc. accept appellant's statement of 
facts of the case except for the statement in paragraph 
11 on page 4 of appellant's brief, to the effect that "E. L. 
Murphy Trucking Company virtually had daily communi-
cations with the East Coast Drayage Company from the 
date of billing including personal visits . . ." While this 
assertion seems immaterial to the issues presented by the 
appeal, these assertions are nowhere supported in the 
record. In addition, appellant's statement of facts fails 
to state that unequivocal demand for payment was not 
made by appellant upon co-respondent American Stan-
dard, Inc. until July 11, 1972 (R-100), and fails to state 
that demand for payment was not made by appellant upon 
respondent Climate Control until September 28, 1972 
(R-104). 
In the interest of clarity, however, these parties pre-
sent the following summary of the transactions from which 
this lawsuit arises. In late 1971, Climate Control ordered 
some large air conditioning units from American Stan-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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dard's predecessor in interest in this matter. The contract 
under which these units were sold prescribed that Ameri-
can Standard would prepay the freight charges necessary 
to ship the units from Carteret, New Jersey, to Salt Lake 
City, Utah. American Standard contracted with a New 
Jersey company called B & M Trading to have the air 
conditioning units shipped to Salt Lake. B & M Trading 
in turn contracted with another New Jersey company, 
East Coast Drayage Company, to ship the units. Finally, 
East Coast Drayage Company contracted with plaintiff, 
E. L. Murphy Trucking Company, to transport the air 
conditioning units to Salt Lake City. Murphy Trucking 
Company accepted the air conditioning units for shipment 
on November 5, 1971, and prepared four bills of lading, 
one of which was applicable to each of the four truckloads 
to air conditioning equipment in question. As indicated 
in appellant's Statement of Facts, one of these documents 
stated that the freight charges were "prepaid," one indi-
cated that the freight charges were "to be prepaid," and 
two of the bills omitted any notation about prepayment 
of freight charges. Each of Murphy Trucking's four bills 
of lading, however, state: "Bill To: East Coast Drayage 
Corporation, 901 East Linden Ave., Linden, New Jersey 
07036" (R-lll , -113, -115, -117). It is undisputed that 
all of the bills of lading prepared by American Standard 
stated that the freight charges were "to be prepaid" (R-
46-57). Plaintiff transported the four truckloads of air 
conditioning units to Salt Lake City between about No-
vember 16 and November 19, 1971, and delivered them 
to Climate Control with Murphy Trucking's bills of lad-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ing referred to above, and without making any demand 
for payment upon Climate Control or American Standard. 
Appellant billed East Coast Drayage Company for 
the shipping charges on November 17 and 18, 1971. Over 
the next several months, Murphy Trucking attempted to 
collect its freight charges from East Coast Drayage (R-
83-90). Almost four months after delivery of the ship-
ment, Murphy Trucking Company's attorneys discovered 
that East Coast Drayage Company was apparently in 
financial difficulty and was unlikely to be able to pay 
the freight charges in question (R-91). Plaintiff first 
made demand for payment of these charges on American 
Standard on July 11, 1972, almost six months after de-
livering the goods (R-100) and first made demand on 
Climate Control on September 28,1972, some nine months 
after delivering the goods in question (R-104). 
In the meantime, American Standard had made pay-
ment for these shipping charges to B & M Trading Com-
pany on November 9, 1971, shortly after the goods were 
picked up (R-40), and Climate Control had completed 
payment of the price of the air conditioning units and 
freight charges to American Standard on January 14,1972 
(R-124). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM AS-
SERTING DOUBLE LIABILITY AGAINST 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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EITHER AMERICAN STANDARD OR CLI-
MATE CONTROL. 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether E. L. 
Murphy Trucking Company is estopped from claiming 
that either Climate Control or American Standard, each 
having once paid the freight charges at issue in this case, 
is liable to pay them a second time to appellant. 
Climate Control and American Standard contend that 
this case is governed by the holdings of Consolidated 
Freightways Corporation v. Admiral Corporation, 442 F. 
2d 56 (7th Cir. 1971), and Missouri Pacific Railroad Com-
pany v. National Milling Company, 409 F. 2d 882 (3rd 
Cir. 1969), and that those cases hold that appellant is 
estopped from asserting its claim of double liability against 
either Climate Control or American Standard. 
In the Admiral case, some electrical components im-
ported from Japan had been shipped from their arrival 
port on the west coast to Admiral's plants in Illinois un-
der a contract in which a west coast shipper arranged 
customs clearance for the imported goods and then se-
lected a motor carrier to transport the goods inland. The 
shipper agreed to prepay the freight charges in question. 
The plaintiff carrier prepared bills of lading which stated 
that Admiral was the consignee, and that the shipper was 
the party to be billed (emphasis added). The bills of 
lading also stated that the freight charges had been pre-
paid, or were to be prepaid. The carrier delivered the 
goods to the consignee without making demand for pay-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ment, without reserving any right to claim payment from 
the consignee or the manufacturer in the event it was un-
able to collect from the shipper, and without notifying 
the consignee that it had not been paid by the shipper. 
Following delivery of the goods, Admiral, as consignee, 
paid the freight charges to the shipper. The carrier tried 
in turn to collect the prepaid freight charges from the 
shipper, but was unable to do so because the shipper had 
gone out of business. The Seventh Circuit held that be-
cause of the representations it had made on its bills of 
lading, and because of its failure to notify the consignee 
of the true nature of its credit transactions with the ship-
per, the carrier was estopped from asserting its claim that 
the consignee was liable to pay the freight charges in 
question a second time. In the National Milling case 
the carrier had incorrectly indicated on the bills of lading 
which it delivered with the goods in question that the 
freight charges at issue had been paid by the shipper, 
and had in effect directed the consignee to reimburse the 
shipper. The Third Circuit also held that the carrier was 
estopped from claiming double liability against the con-
signee. 
Appellant claims that two of the facts of this case are 
sufficient to distinguish the National Milling and Admiral 
cases. The first such fact relied upon by appellant is the 
fact that two of the four bills of lading delivered with this 
shipment were not marked "prepaid" or "to be prepaid." 
The second fact relied upon by appellant is the fact that 
the affidavit of Mr. John Dillon states that payment by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Climate Control to American Standard for the shipping 
charges in question was based upon the American Stan-
dard's bills of lading which recited the fact that all freight 
charges involved in this transaction were to be prepaid 
(R-46-57), and upon the assurance that the goods speci-
fied in the invoices had in fact been received by Climate 
Control, rather than upon the invoices of E. L. Murphy 
Trucking Company (R-19-20). 
The omission by appellant of the notation "prepaid" 
or "to be prepaid" from two of its own bills of lading does 
not distinguish the cases relied upon by respondents. The 
Admiral opinion states explicitly that the bills of lading 
at issue there showed two things: (1) The shipper was 
designated as the party to be billed rather than the con-
signee; (2) The bills were marked "prepaid" or "to be 
prepaid." The opinion relies principally on the fact that 
the bills showed that the shipper was the party to be 
billed, and only secondarily on whether they contained 
the "prepaid" or "to be prepaid" notation. In a footnote 
to the opinion, the question of whether the notations 
regarding prepayment indicated that payment had actu-
ally been made by the shipper was treated as immaterial 
(442 F. 2d at 58 n. 1). The Court was apparently con-
cerned only that the "prepaid" or "to be prepaid" nota-
tions were consistent with the decisive fact about the bills 
— the statement that the carrier intended to look to the 
shipper for payment. Appellant's argument overlooks the 
fact that each of appellant's bills of lading which was pre-
sented to Climate Control affirmatively represented that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appellant also looked to the shipper for payment, and ex-
pected no payment from Climate Control in return for the 
delivery of the goods. The decision in National Milling 
also hinged on the fact that the bills in question, construed 
in the light of the transaction in question, "in effect di-
rected the consignee to reimburse the shipper" (409 F. 2d 
at 883). 
Neither does the affidavit of John Dillon distinguish 
this case from National Milling and Admiral. The issue 
of defendant's reliance on plaintiff's representations was 
not raised in National Milling. The specific argument 
which appellant makes here was presented and rejected 
in Admiral. Plaintiff there argued that the consignee 
could not assert estoppel because it had not relied upon 
the representations of prepayment in making its reim-
bursement to the shipper. The Court rejected that argu-
ment and ruled that in the absence of evidence that the 
consignee had actual knowledge of the fact that the trans-
action was not as the carrier's bills represented it to be, 
the carrier would be estopped from seeking a second pay-
ment from the consignee. Respondents contend that were 
this Court to accept the argument presented by appel-
lant, a carrier could frustrate the intentions of the parties 
to any prepaid freight transaction by simply omitting the 
"prepaid" notation from its own bills of lading. The car-
rier could then accept the benefits of its participation in 
the transaction in the event the freight charges were 
promptly paid, but could avoid the burden of looking to 
the shipper rather than to the consignee for payment in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the event the shipper proved unable to pay. Such a result 
would be contrary to the equitable principle, applicable to 
estoppel in pais, that a party may not retain the benefits 
of an agreement while repudiating its burden. Contractors 
Dump Truck Service, Inc. v Gregg Const, Co,9 46 Cal. 
Rptr. 738 (Cal. App. 19135); Holt \ Ravani, 34 Cal. Rptr. 
417 (Cal. App. 1963). 
Respondents further contend that appellant's argu-
ment that detrimental reliance must be shown to have 
been based upon the specific representation made by ap-
pellant regarding prepayment is contrary to the rule that 
where a party has ratified a contract, he will be estopped 
to assert a proposition contrary to that contract regard-
less of prejudice to the other party. The party who has 
ratified a contract is not bound by the terms of the agree-
ment he ratified because the other party has been preju-
diced thereby. He is bound by the agreement because he 
intended to be bound. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and 
Waiver § 31. It is undisputed here that appellant 
deliberately agreed to participate in the prepaid freight 
agreement, and it is undisputed that appellant had actual 
knowledge at all material times that it was participating 
in a prepaid freight transaction. 
Respondents further contend that this portion of 
appellant's agreement overlooks the fact that estoppel 
may be based upon silence despite a duty to speak. 
The applicable Interstate Commerce Commission 
regulations imposed upon appellant the responsibility for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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deciding whether to accept the goods in question from the 
shipper without first receiving payment. These regulations 
state: "upon taking precautions deemed by them to be 
sufficient to assure payment of the tariff charges within 
the credit period herein specified, common carriers by mo-
tor vehicle may relinquish possession of freight in advance 
of the payment of the delivery charges thereon and 
may extend credit in the amount of such charges to those 
who undertake to pay them, such persons herein being 
called shippers, for a period of seven days excluding Sat-
urdays, Sundays, and legal holidays." 49 C. F. R. § 1322.1 
(1972). Appellant is in effect asking this Court to amend 
this federal regulation so as to relieve appellant from the 
obligation to assume responsibility for the selection of 
those persons or businesses to whom it extends credit. 
Murphy Trucking, by its election to participate in the pre-
paid freight transaction in question, became bound by the 
terms of the agreement it had ratified between American 
Standard and Climate Control. American Standard and 
Climate control were entitled to assume that appellant 
would fulfill its obligations under the I. C. C. regulations 
quoted above. In the event appellant intended to assert 
any claim contrary to those expectations which were the 
logical consequence of its agreement with American Stan-
dard and Climate Control, the Admiral case requires that 
the carrier communicate that contrary intention or be 
estopped from asserting once it becomes clear that the 
shipper turned out to be a bad credit risk. 
Those inferences reasonably to be drawn from all of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the facts and circumstances of this case indicate that the 
single statement relied on by appellant from the affidavit 
of Mr. John Dillon (Brief of Appellant at 5) does not 
negate the conclusion that Climate Control relied upon 
the assertions and the inferences of appellant in making 
payment to American Standard for the shipping charges 
in question. Read in its entirety and construed in the 
light of the nature of the transaction involved, the affi-
davit of Mr. John Dillon indicates that in making pay-
ment to American Standard, Climate Control was relying 
upon the belief that those expectations reasonably to be 
inferred from their contract with American Standard had 
been fully consummated. Murphy Trucking affirmatively 
represented, by stating on all of the bills of lading that 
it was looking to East Coast Drayage for payment, by 
verifying on two of the bills of lading that it knew it was 
participating in a freight prepaid transaction, and by de-
livering the air conditioning units without communicating 
any demand for payment, that Murphy Trucking had 
ratified the transaction and was content to abide by those 
expectations which Climate Control and American Stan-
dard had established by their agreement governing the 
freight charges. 
Similarly, appellant's claim that, in making payment 
to American Standard, Climate Control was only doing 
something it was legally obligated to do is without merit, 
The Admiral case specifically states that the consignee 
has no duty to expose himself to the risk of double lia-
bility (442 F. 2d at 59). The case of Northern State Con-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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struction Company v. Robbins, 457 P. 2d 187 (Wash. 
1969), cited by appellant, involves promissory estoppel, 
a substitute for consideration, and is not in point here. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO BASIS IN 
LAW FOR ITS CLAIM OF L I A B I L I T Y 
A G A I N S T EITHER AMERICAN STAN-
DARD OR CLIMATE CONTROL. 
The line of cases, including Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. Louis Railroad v. Fink, 259 U. S. 577, 40 
S. Ct. 27 (1919), and Louisville & N. R. R. v. Central 
Iron and Coal Co., 265 U. S. 59, 44 S. Ct. 441 (1924), cited 
in appellant's brief as standing for the proposition that 
the consignee should be presumed liable for payment of 
freight charges absent a showing that he is an agent with 
no beneficial interest in the shipped property have no 
application at all to the facts of this case. The Admiral 
and National Milling cases and Consolidated Freightways 
Corp. v. Eddy, 513 P. 2d 1161 (Ore. 1973), relied on by 
appellant, all clearly distinguish the Fink and Central 
Iron line of cases. These cases, referred to as "under 
charge" cases in the Admiral (442 F. 2d at 62) and Eddy 
(513 P. 2d at 1164) opinions, deal with whether a con-
signee could assert that a public carrier was estopped 
from collecting the full rate prescribed under its ICC 
tariffs for the shipment in question. None of these cases 
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raised the issue of whether or not the consignee was liable. 
In each of these cases it was conceded that the consignee 
owed some liability to the carrier. The only issue pre-
sented was whether the consignee could assert that the 
carrier was estopped from recovering the full tariff rate 
by virtue of the fact that the carrier had in some way 
represented that it would accept a lesser rate. The 
rationale of these cases, as noted in the Eddy opinion 
(513 P. 2d at 1165) is simply that a consignee or a ship-
per are conclusively presumed to know the tariff rate and 
will therefore not be permitted to assert estoppel against 
the carrier where the carrier has represented that it will 
accept payment in a lesser amount as satisfaction of its 
freight charges. Estoppel might be equitable in the "un-
dercharge" cases, but its application could frustrate the 
prevention of rebates which is the underlying purpose 
of the ICC statutes relied on by appellant. 
The issue presented by this appeal concerns not the 
amount of the freight charges, but whether appellant can 
assert any claim of liability against respondents. A careful 
reading of the Admiral, National Milling, and Eddy cases 
shows that those cases have established the proposition 
that the determination of the question presented here — 
whether Murphy Trucking can assert any claim for dou-
ble payment against either Climate Control or American 
Standard is simply not governed by the ICC statutes 
cited in appellant's brief (513 P. 2d at 1165). The Eddy 
case, relied upon by appellant in its brief, says: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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When the question is not the amount of the 
freight charge, but merely which party is to be 
responsible for paying that amount, the possi-
bility of discrimination in rates is not involved. 
The purpose of the legislation is not thwarted 
by holding that a carrier may be estopped to col-
lect its freight charges from the consignee, and 
must look solely to the shipper (513 P. 2d at 
1165), 
It necessarily follows that the contention expressed in 
Appellant's brief to the effect that under the facts of this 
case "both the consignor and the consignee are both con-
tractually and or statutorily liable for all goods trans-
ported by a carrier". (Brief of Appellant at 14) is simply 
wrong under the holdings of the very cases cited by ap-
pellant. Respondents contend that the single proposition 
which it is most important that this Court see in those 
cases cited by both respondents and appellant is the fact 
that the sole issue presented by this appeal—whether any 
liability exists to the appellant from either of the respon-
dents — has not been dealt with at all in the ICC stat-
utes or regulations, but has been left to be determined 
by contractual agreement by the parties to each individual 
shipping transaction. This proposition is clearly stated in 
the Admiral opinion: 
The undercharge cases are thus consistent 
with and, indeed, support our conclusion that 
Section 223 was not intended to fasten a rigid lia-
bility upon a consignee. Congress left the initial 
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determination of a party's liability for freight 
charges to express contractual agreement or im-
plication of law. So long as payment of the 
full tariff charges may be demanded from some 
party, the anti-discrimination policy of the Sec-
tion is satisfied. Congress did not undertake to 
settle all issues of collection with the enactment 
of Section 223. Nor did Congress intend to 
fashion a sword to insure collection in every in-
stance and a shield to insulate the carrier from 
the legal consequences of otherwise negligent or 
inequitable conduct. (442 F. 2d at 62, citations 
omitted.) 
Of all of the cases cited in appellant's brief only three, 
the Admiral, National Milling, and Eddy cases, deal with 
the specific issue presented here — in a prepaid freight 
transaction, what acts or omissions on the part of the 
carrier will, as a matter of law, estop the carrier from 
attempting to collect double payment of the freight 
charges in question from the originating shipper or 
the consignee? Respondents contend that the entire 
argument presented by appellant is fatally flawed in that 
it fails to recognize that these cases require that a prepaid 
freight transaction be treated differently from the normal 
shipping transaction. When viewed in the light of the 
underlying purpose and policies of the ICC statutes and 
regulations, the distinction thus recognized between a 
shipment in which freight charges have been prepaid and 
one in which they have not been prepaid makes good 
sense. The carrier's normal recourse against a non-paying 
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consignee would be to refuse to deliver the goods shipped. 
In such a situation, it makes good sense for the carrier 
to be able to deliver the goods without relinquishing its 
claim of liability against the parties to the sale of the 
goods. These parties have had the benefit of the carrier's 
services, and have not paid any money for those services. 
In the case of a shipment involving prepaid freight, the 
parties to the contract for the sale and shipment of the 
goods have themselves included in their contract a provi-
sion which accrues to the benefit of the carrier. In a pre-
paid freight situation, the parties to this original contract 
have performed an affirmative act which should be expected 
to have the effect of increasing the carrier's assurance 
that it will receive payment for its services, and of ac-
celerating the time at which it will receive such payment. 
This being true, it makes eminent good sense to require 
that in the event the carrier wishes to assert a claim of 
liability which would have the effect of disrupting the 
expectations thus established between the parties to the 
original contract for the sale of the goods, which the car-
rier has ratified, the carrier must assume the burden of 
clearly and promptly communicating his contrary inten-
tion to any of the other parties as against whom he wishes 
to preserve his right to claim liability. Respondents con-
tent that this, and no less, is what the Admiral, and Na-
tional Milling cases require of a carrier in order to pre-
serve any right to later assert a claim of double liability 
such as is presented here. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
Respondents further contend that the Admiral, Na-
tional Milling and Eddy cases stand for the proposition 
that estopping the carrier from subjecting a consignee, 
or a party in American Standard's position, to possible 
double liability for freight charges which it has already 
paid does not present a situation in which the equitable 
principles of estoppel can be applied to frustrate in any 
way the statutory purposes of the IOC acts and regula-
tions. While it is true that the ICC regulation quoted 
above has been held not to be for the benefit of the con-
signee, it is equally true that the ICC statutes and regu-
lations do not impose any presumption of double liability 
for the benefit of the carrier. As the Seventh Circuit 
stated in the Admiral case: 
Requiring double payment of the charge by [the 
consignee] would not further the statutory pol-
icy of preventing "unjust discrimination or un-
due preference" . . . Permitting recovery in this 
case would serve only to reward the carrier for 
its unlawful as well as inequitable conduct. We 
decline to turn Section 223 inside out to achieve 
that anomalous result (442 F. 2d at 63). 
The Admiral, National Milling and Eddy cases should 
be viewed as applying all of the equitable principles of 
estoppel to a specific fact situation — a prepaid freight 
transaction. The application of those equitable principles 
in the Admiral, and National Milling cases is consistent 
with the Utah Supreme Court cases of Farmers and Mer-
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chants Bank v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation, 4 
Utah 2d 155, 289 P. 2d 1045 (1955); Green v. Gam, 11 
Utah 2d 375, 359 P. 2d 1050 (1961), cited by appellant 
in its brief. Appellant seems to argue in its brief that in 
order to support the lower court's ruling this court must 
first find the Admiral and National Milling cases to be 
in point and, in addition, find that the facts of this case 
match the facts of the Utah cases cited above. Respon-
dents contend that the Admiral and National Milling 
cases are well-reasoned applications of the equitable prin-
ciples of estoppel to the specific fact situation presented 
here, and that the argument presented by appellant runs 
contrary to the proposition, acknowledged by appellant 
in its brief, that estoppel can not be subjected to fixed 
and settled rules having universal application (Brief of 
Appellant at 10). 
Of all of the cases relied on by appellant, only the 
Eddy case deals with a prepaid freight transaction, and 
that case is distinguishable from the instant facts. In 
Eddy, the court held that because the defendant con-
signee had failed to plead that he had relied on plaintiff's 
actions, and had then subsequently failed to amend his 
answer to plead the defense of estoppel after his first 
demurrer had been held insufficient, the plaintiff would 
not be estopped to assert its claim of liability against de-
fendant. In the instant case appellant acknowledges 
that Climate Control has pled the defense of estoppel 
which the defendant had failed to plead in Eddy (Brief of 
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Appellant at 6). American Standard pled affirmatively 
that appellant is estopped because of its actions and be-
cause American Standard acted as it did in reliance upon 
appellant's representations (R-59-60). In addition, in the 
Eddy case there was 
. . . no allegation that the bill of lading contained 
any notation that the freight had been prepaid 
and no allegation that defendant was mislead in-
to assuming that the freight had been prepaid 
by any other representations or conduct of the 
carrier (513 P. 2d at 1166, emphasis added). 
The fact that appellant here affirmatively represented 
on its bills of lading that it would look to East Coast 
Drayage for payment of the freight charges, and the 
fact that the bills of lading did contain some notation 
that the freight had been prepaid, distinguish the Eddy 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's affirmative representations that it would 
look to the shipper for payment of the freight charges in 
question, together with its incomplete notations of pre-
payment on the bills of lading, its delivery of goods with-
out demand for payment, its failure to communicate to 
either American Standard or Climate Control that it had 
not in fact received payment from the shipper, and its 
delay in asserting any claim for payment of the freight 
charges until after both American Standard and Climate 
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Control had fully paid the freight charges in question, 
bring this case squarely within the holdings of the Ad-
miral and National Milling cases. Appellant ratified the 
agreement of American Standard and Climate Control, 
and they were entitled to rely on their expectations that 
delivery of the goods in question together with bills of 
lading which affirmed Appellant's ratification of the pre-
paid freight arrangement would mean that the transac-
tion had been fully consummated and that they were 
safe from exposure to double liability if they completed 
payment in accordance with the terms of their agreement. 
Appellant had the burden of placing these parties on no-
tice of any claims it intended to assert against them be-
fore they made payment of the freight charges, thus 
changing their position to their detriment. Appellant 
failed to give such notification, and, in fact, affirmatively 
ratified the prepaid transaction. Under these circum-
stances, appellant may not now seek to impose double 
liability on either of respondents, and the lower court's 
ruling was, accordingly, correct. 
The "over charge" cases cited by Appellant provide 
no basis for imposing double liability on either American 
Standard or Climate Control. While it is regrettable that 
the freight charges which were paid in this case by both 
American Standard and Climate Control did not reach 
appellant to compensate it for its services, both the ICC 
regulations and the applicable case law place the burden 
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of assuming that risk upon appellant. That burden can-
not, as a matter of law, be transferred to either American 
Standard or Climate Control. 
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